Trump’s use of Pakistan as possible mediator with Iran sparks memories of Nixon’s China talks and Bangladesh liberation

Trump's engagement with Pakistan as a mediator for Iran echoes Nixon's historical diplomacy with China amid shifting geopolitical dynamics.

Pakistan’s emergence as Washington’s choice as a mediator in talks with Iran can be explained in a number of ways. Since Operation Sindoor in May 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump has been flattered by Pakistan’s description of him as a “peacemaker”, and he has reportedly built a personal rapport with Pakistan’s Field Marshal General Asim Munir and Pakistani PM Shehbaz Sharif, meeting them a number of times.

In particular, Mr. Trump hosted General Munir to lunch at the White House in June last year, amidst the last U.S.-Israeli strikes in June 2025, in an effort reportedly to ensure that Pakistan would not support Iran militarily.

Pakistan’s offer of a critical minerals deal to the U.S. and decision to join the Gaza Board of Peace (BoP) have also helped forge the relationship.

For Iran, Pakistan’s advantage over many other possible mediators is not only its proximity but also the fact that it does not recognise Israel, and thus is not amenable to concerns or inputs from the Netanyahu government. This may suit Mr. Trump as well, who has reportedly conveyed a 15-point proposal to the government in Tehran which it hopes would lead to a ceasefire.

However, Washington’s decision to engage Pakistan as a facilitator for talks may also be rooted in history, given Islamabad, and a different General’s role in facilitating U.S. talks with China 55 years ago, at the height of the Cold War.

At that time, U.S. President Richard Nixon had begun to work on his plan to open up relations with Beijing (U.S. still formally recognised Taiwan as the Republic of China (ROC)), but direct Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial talks had floundered. Pakistan was not the first option, as he and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger considered others, including Poland, France and Romania.