One Nation, One Election — remedy worse than disease

The promised benefits of the One Nation, One Election proposal are overstated, while its structural harms are profound

In 2019, Indonesia held a historic one-day election for the President, national and regional legislatures, and local councils. Aimed at cutting costs and simplifying administration, it came at a tragic human cost: nearly 900 poll workers died and over 5,000 fell seriously ill. In 2024, there was again a heavy toll — more than 100 deaths and nearly 15,000 illnesses. In June 2025, the Constitutional Court ruled that national and local elections must be held separately from 2029, two to two-and-a-half years apart, citing voter and administrator overload and the impact on democratic participation.

Supporters of India’s ‘One Nation, One Election’ (ONOE) proposal argue that synchronising the Lok Sabha (general election) and State Assembly elections would reduce expenditure, limit prolonged security deployments, minimise disruptions caused by the Model Code of Conduct (MCC), and prevent political parties from remaining in constant campaign mode. Indonesia’s experience, however, offers a cautionary lesson.

Comparative constitutional practice offers little support for enforced electoral synchronisation. In Canada, federal and provincial elections occur independently. In Australia, synchronisation is impossible: State legislatures serve fixed four-year terms, while the federal House of Representatives has a maximum tenure of three years.

Germany is often miscited. Its stability arises not from synchronised elections — Länder polls are deliberately staggered — but from the Constructive Vote of No Confidence, which requires the Bundestag to elect a successor before removing a Chancellor.

South Africa and Indonesia use proportional representation, which diffuses political power and protects minority voices. India’s first-past-the-post system lacks such safeguards, allowing a national wave to sweep State elections. The United States offers an even weaker analogy: fixed electoral cycles function there because the executive’s tenure is insulated from legislative confidence in a presidential system.

The most comprehensive blueprint emerged from the High-Level Committee ((2023-24) chaired by former President Ram Nath Kovind, now taking legislative form in the Constitution (One Hundred and Twenty-ninth Amendment) Bill, 2024. The proposed Article 82A empowers the President to notify an “appointed date” from which all State Assembly tenures would align with the Lok Sabha’s cycle. Assemblies constituted after this date would have their tenure curtailed, even if their five-year term had not expired. The Bill also introduces “unexpired-term elections”: if a legislature is dissolved prematurely, the new legislature would serve only the remainder of the original term rather than receiving a fresh mandate. Additionally, it grants the Election Commission of India the authority to recommend deferring State elections if simultaneous conduct proves impracticable. Amendments are proposed to Articles 83, 172, and 327. These changes raise serious constitutional concerns.