The delusion of eliminating ‘the last terrorist’ Premium

The past and present of insurgency in Rajouri-Poonch districts vindicate the argument related to the futility of an obsession with the number of ‘kills’

In Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), the new year dawned in the backdrop of a terror strike in Rajouri-Poonch districts at Dera ki Gali (DKG), where four soldiers were killed in an ambush. In its aftermath, three civilians were alleged to have been killed by security forces. The Director General of Police, J&K, in his media briefing on the year’s round up, touched upon the encouraging numbers of terrorists killed, and how the things in the Union Territory (UT) were looking up. At around the same time, there was a media report, giving the nuances related to the number of terrorists killed by a paramilitary force in 2023, which was lower than the previous year, and, hence, a cause of concern. The Union Home Minister too, while reviewing the security situation in the UT, exhorted the security forces to destroy the terror infrastructure. This, in all probability, implied maximising the neutralisation of terror cadres.

While it cannot be denied that neutralising terrorists is one of the most crucial objectives of the security operations, it ought not become the overriding factor, especially in the present context of lower terror indices. In this backdrop, an obsession with the numbers of terrorists killed may be debatable vis-à-vis its effect in the mid and long term.

The past and present of insurgency in Rajouri-Poonch districts vindicate the argument related to the futility of an obsession with the number of ‘kills’. Simply put, the last terrorist can seldom be killed. Insurgency was at its peak in the late 1990s and early 2000s in this region. By virtue of the toil and sacrifices of the uniformed services, the situation changed for the better and by 2011-12, the region was on the verge of being declared terror free.

It is amply clear that the state machinery was unable to consolidate and build up on the gains made. And, at present, the region appears to be going down the abyss, yet again. In hindsight, it may be inferred that one of the main attributes leading to the re-emergence of instability is the misplaced focus of the counter terrorism approach. In our undue obsession with the numbers of ‘kills’ as parameters of a successful counter-terror campaign, we may have been winning the battle by addressing the symptoms, but it has indeed been at the cost of the campaign.

Paradoxically, combating insurgencies is challenging when terror-related incidents are on decline and the need for recognition pushes units to scout for easier ways to gain tangibles. Most often, it gets down to being a case of the ‘tail wagging the dog’, wherein the ends are chased with a total disregard to the means. Chasing numbers was the obvious option in the years when terror-related fatalities in J&K touched a yearly mark of 2,000-plus. This is in sharp contrast to the declining fatalities post 2007, with the figures at 134 in 2023 (South Asia Terror Portal). The situational dynamics, unfortunately, never ushered in adjustments in the modus operandi of security forces and assessment methodology of unit performance by the hierarchy. Changed dynamics warranted efforts at peace building, consolidation and conflict management. The system has been reluctant to adapt. ‘Tangibles prove performance’ continues to be the bottom-line, mainly due to factors such as limited tenures, primacy of short-term gains, competitive career environments, and a false sense of glory.

As in the classical teaching of counter insurgency, tactical-level operations, duly backed by psychological operations, have to be people-centric. Winning the hearts and the minds of the population has been a cliched but most overlooked dictum. A perseverance to address people’s aspirations is most often sacrificed at the altar of so-called performance imperatives. It is noteworthy that although various agencies of the state involved in a conflict zone do formulate and execute people-centric policies, the cultural orientation of the same at execution levels is missing. This has often resulted in lapses such as what manifested in the unfortunate death of three civilians in DKG. Also, in several instances, we have suffered an avoidable loss of officers and jawans in an operational rush to acquire ‘kills’. The bad name caused casts a sombre shadow on the hard-earned values, ethics and traditions of the security forces.

Given our democratic setup, the nation implies people. A security force of the nation must defend its people and their dignity, even at its own cost. Leadership is all about compensating any cost to the soldier, with the leader standing up to bridge the gap between the interests of people and soldiers. Ideally, there should be no contradiction between the requirements of people and soldiers, who have to be commanded accordingly. Clearly, if people’s acceptance is the ‘end’, then an oversight on the ‘means’ provisioned by soldiers is indispensable. And, lastly, security forces have the task of managing the conflict and handing over a stable situation to the government machinery for due political process, with enhanced participation and stakeholding of the people. Many a time, the security forces have been successful in doing that, only to be met with unprepared and reluctant political initiatives.