Rupture across the Durand Line

Escalating cross-border strikes between Pakistan and Afghanistan expose a widening political, military, and societal divide between Islamabad and Kabul, despite earlier attempts at dialogue and de-escalation. Disputes over the handling of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, rising militant activities in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Pakistan’s shift to a military approach deepen mistrust between the establishment and the Taliban leadership.

For the second time in six months, Pakistan and Afghanistan have engaged in an intense military clash. Unlike the periodic clashes across the Durand Line during the last two decades when the U.S. was in Afghanistan, the latest clashes — first in October and now again last week — are significant. Pakistan used air and missile strikes deep inside Afghanistan, including in Kabul and Kandahar, while the Taliban targeted multiple Pakistani military posts across the Durand Line. Military and civilian casualties in these two attacks, last year’s and the ongoing one, have been high. The latest attacks come despite a ceasefire mediated by Turkiye and Qatar following the post-October 2025 clashes.

Following the latest military strikes, Pakistan’s Defence Minister declared that it would be an “open war” against Afghanistan. What has happened between Pakistan and Afghanistan during the last six months? After creating the Taliban in the 1990s and nurturing it ever since, even under intense American pressure until August 2021, why is Pakistan’s Deep State now going after its creation? Why has the Taliban, despite being supported by Pakistan and taking refuge within Pakistan during the U.S.-led war on terrorism, turned against its erstwhile mentor?

The two rounds of military clashes highlight a rupture in the bilateral relationship at three levels.

First, at the political level, between Islamabad and Kabul. Though the two countries had differences during the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan during 2001-21, they were expected to be bridged when the Taliban captured Kabul immediately after the American exit in 2021. Instead, despite multiple rounds of dialogue, the bilateral relationship has only worsened. Pakistani Defence Minister’s declaration of an “open war” on Afghanistan signifies a political rupture.

Second, there is a rupture between Pakistan’s Establishment and the Taliban leadership. From the mid-1990s, the political and military rise of the Taliban would not have happened without the Pakistan Establishment’s support. Successive military and ISI chiefs supported the Taliban. Today, under new military and ISI leadership in Pakistan, that link remains ruptured. Islamabad would not have declared an “open war” without Rawalpindi’s approval.

Third, there is a widening rupture between the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan. During the last few years, there has been an intense debate over deporting the Afghans, who have arrived in Pakistan during different phases, and made the country their home. Ever since the current Pakistani government began actively pushing them back, there has been an intense resistance from Afghanistan and the Taliban. However, within Pakistan, there was no major societal debate, contrary to the state’s position. Though a small section of Pakistan seeks to build consensus on the issue, it remains a minority voice. Beyond the political and military rupture across the Durand Line, the societal divide will haunt the two nations for generations to come, as this alliance was forged over centuries.