Scientist fired from Winnipeg disease lab intentionally worked to benefit China: CSIS report

One of the scientists who was fired from Canada's top infectious disease laboratory "intentionally" shared scientific information with China — potentially putting people's health in jeopardy — says an assessment by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).  

The intelligence assessment was released late Wednesday afternoon by the federal government, along with hundreds of other documents about the mysterious dismissal of Dr. Xiangguo Qiu and her husband Keding Cheng.

The scientists and their students worked in the Level 4 virology facility at the Winnipeg-based National Microbiology Lab (NML), which is equipped to deal with the most serious and deadly human and animal diseases.

The couple were marched out of the facility in July 2019 and were stripped of their security clearances. Their dismissals were announced in January 2021, triggering concerns about Chinese espionage and leading to heated demands in Parliament for more information.

According to the documents, CSIS conducted multiple security screenings of the couple.

The document show the service had a more rosy initial assessment of Qiu's motivation, noting in spring of 2020 that she could be "susceptible ... based on the belief in the power of science to help humanity."

But as the investigation went deeper, CSIS's concerns deepened. A few months later, CSIS wrote Qiu was using the level 4 lab in Canada "as a base to assist China to improve its capability to fight highly-pathogenic pathogens" and "achieved brilliant results."

Qiu provided Beijing "with the Ebola genetic sequence, which opened a door of convenience for China," wrote CSIS.

CSIS accused Qiu of being associated with multiple "talent programs" administered and funded by various Chinese entities.

Those programs are set up to "boost China's national technological capabilities and may pose a serious threat to research institutions, including government research facilities, by incentivizing economic espionage and theft of intellectual property," said CSIS in the report.

In early January 2021, the head of CSIS's security screening program issued a dire warning about Qiu's trustworthiness and her "close and clandestine relationships with a variety of entities of the PRC, which is a known security threat to Canada."

The service also called out her "reckless judgement regarding decisions that could have impacted public safety and the interests of Canada."

"The service assesses that Ms. Qiu developed deep, cooperative relationships with a variety of People's Republic of China (PRC) institutions and has intentionally transferred scientific knowledge and materials to China in order to benefit the PRC Government, and herself, without regard for the implications to her employer or to Canada's interests," CSIS wrote.

"Because of her extensive knowledge of the harmful effects of dangerous pathogens on human health, Ms. Qiu should have been aware of the possibility that her efforts to engage clandestinely with the PRC in these research areas could harm Canadian interests or international security."