Iran-Israel conflict: After the war, enter the diplomats

Following American airstrikes against Iranian nuclear facilities last week, and then the imposition of a ceasefire, it’s time to step back and assess what has changed in the Middle East, and the chances of translating military success into lasting strategic gains.

Following American airstrikes against Iranian nuclear facilities last week, and then the imposition of a ceasefire, it’s time to step back and assess what has changed in the Middle East, and the chances of translating military success into lasting strategic gains. In a national security crisis, what does not happen can be as important as what does. That is particularly true regarding the recent conflict with Iran. For years, analysts predicted that an American strike into Iran would result in an all-out war in the Middle East, hundreds if not thousands of American casualties, and a ladder of escalation that Tehran might ultimately control through asymmetrical means — such as militias across the region with weapons capable of striking American personnel and positions. I had thought those claims were exaggerated and a product of Iranian propaganda as much as sound analysis. That’s been especially true in this crisis, which unfolded after a nearly 18-month degradation of Iranian power by Israel in response to Tehran’s fateful decision to join in a war against its rival shortly after Hamas’ attack into Israel on October 7, 2023. Today, we have not just theories and predictions of Iran’s response to an American attack — but lived experience. And so far, it turns out the pessimists were wrong. Iran responded feebly with a telegraphed and defeated missile attack against a US base in Qatar, which served only to unite the Gulf states in condemnation of Iran. Iran’s militias — from Hezbollah in Lebanon, already degraded after losing its own conflict with Israel last year, to the Iraqi militias under the control of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps — stood down entirely. Further afield, nobody came to Iran’s assistance. There is a theory in foreign policy circles that an alliance called “CRINK” — China, Russia, Iran, North Korea — might band together in a crisis or conflict with the West. No doubt, this collection of states may form tactical and issue-specific partnerships such as North Korea and Iran supporting Russia in its war against Ukraine. But when push came to shove in the Middle East, with Iran suffering its greatest military setbacks since its 1979 revolution, these partners were nowhere to be found. China made clear that Iran should not think about shutting the Strait of Hormuz given its reliance on Gulf oil exports, and when Iran’s foreign minister visited Russia amid the crisis, he left with only a benign statement from Moscow calling for de-escalation.