'There was no plan': Ottawa police floundered as convoy protest grew

On Friday, Feb. 4, Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) Supt. Craig Abrams was at his command post watching Ottawa's then chief of police Peter Sloly speak to reporters on live TV.

It was the eve of what was expected to be a second weekend of mayhem in the capital, with hundreds, perhaps thousands of anti-vaccine mandate and anti-government protesters ready to descend on the city to join those already encamped downtown, creating what Sloly described as an increasingly volatile and potentially dangerous environment.

What really caught Abrams's ear was Sloly's announcement that based on "new intelligence gathered literally in the last 24 hours," police planned to shut down all ramps from Highway 417 leading into the city.

As one of the provincial force's most senior officers in the region, and the OPP's strategic commander during last winter's convoy protest, Abrams was surprised to hear about the plan, particularly since the OPP has jurisdiction over both the highway and the ramps that would soon have to be closed.

Abrams, a 27-year police veteran, knew he had neither the time nor the resources to execute the chief's plan.

"It caused me great concern," he testified Thursday before the public inquiry into the federal government's eventual use of the Emergencies Act to end the occupation. "It was totally out of the blue. [I was] unprepared and unaware."

Abrams texted Ottawa Police Service (OPS) Deputy Chief Steve Bell, who had been standing behind Sloly during the announcement.

"He indicated that there was no new intelligence, and there was no plan to close ramps," Abrams told the commission.

Perplexed, Abrams double-checked with the OPP's critical incident commander at the National Capital Region Command Centre (NCRCC), where municipal, provincial and federal police pooled their resources.

"They were never even notified. This was the chief's idea," Abrams said.

It was just one of many troubling accounts heard at the inquiry last week that illustrated the apparent lack of any cohesive, practical plan to end the siege for nearly two weeks.

While the commission's real purpose is to determine whether the decision to invoke the special powers available under the act was justified, the early testimony and documents that have been entered into evidence have also lifted the veil on the confusion, dysfunction and mistrust that existed among the top ranks of the OPS — an atmosphere that may have contributed to the delay in any effective police response to the crisis.

Abrams testified that as early as the first weekend, OPP dispatched a small contingent of public order officers to Ottawa to help the OPS regain control, but that on at least one occasion, most of them sat around OPS headquarters on Elgin Street without being deployed. 

By that Monday, when it was becoming clear, as prior intelligence had forewarned, that many protesters were digging in rather than heading home, Ottawa police, whose command was either unaware of or unconcerned by that information, were scrambling to figure out how to deal with what Sloly was already calling an occupation.