The changing economy of rural West Bengal 

How the upcoming panchayat elections in West Bengal will be affected by the changing economic and political shifts

As panchayat elections are nearing in West Bengal — voting is on July 8 — three streams of political discourse are becoming more and more apparent across different platforms. The first stream often reiterates the inevitability of the Trinamool Congress retaining its majority despite several corruption and criminal charges against members of the leadership in recent times. This line of discourse primarily banks on the large-scale cash-transfer schemes and the ‘incorruptible’ public image of the Chief Minister.

The second discourse acknowledges the recent win recorded by the Left-Congress alliance in the recent by-election (it is another matter that the candidate has since joined Trinamool) and other local body elections while dismissing their chance at becoming a harbinger of change at the larger electoral level. This is partly due to the previous Assembly Election performances and more importantly a critique of the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPIM) led Left Front being a party of ‘old-veterans’.

The third stream that is doing the rounds still hopes that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) could be a game-changer and could stand up to the alleged violence and cut-money culture that Trinamool is often associated with. However, this stream of discourse is getting quieter because of the regular in-and-out migration of political leaders between the Trinamool and the BJP. Therefore, at this juncture, the BJP might be considered to be in an incapacitated condition within the political arena of West Bengal. In this article, we will focus on the changes that have occurred in the rural economy of West Bengal during the last decade, and how those changes have shaped the political formations for both the Trinamool and the Left. This might provide a deeper understanding of the first and second discourses that we have mentioned above, and take the discussion beyond the tiring binary rhetoric of ‘Trinamool’s cash transfer worked’ and ‘CPI(M) is old’.

For an analysis of change in class structures, the first characteristic of rural West Bengal that stands out is a gradual, secular process of households losing land — of de-peasantisation and subsequent proletarianisation. And as per succeeding reports of the National Family Health Survey, this proportion has steadily decreased. According to the NFHS-5, 2019–21, over 65.2% of all rural families in West Bengal do not own any agricultural land. The most recent Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS, 2020) before COVID classifies less than a quarter (24.1%) of all rural households as self-employed in agriculture (that is, whose primary source of income was self-employment in agriculture) — a broad requirement for being classified as a peasant household. This is a minor increase over the 19% estimate provided by the most recent NSSO Employment Unemployment Survey (EUS 2011–12). Furthermore, 95% of the operational holdings in the State have fallen below one hectare. This means the subsequent fragmentation of land parcels have made the average size of operational holdings 0.35 hectares in 2018-19. This is quite low compared with the all-India average. With the rising cost of cultivation (partly attributed to irrigation costs) and the lack of price realisation, the average income from crop and livestock cultivation has become minuscule when seen in terms of its share in total household income in the villages. In the recent round of the Situation Assessment Survey (2018-19), it was seen that, in nominal terms, a typical agricultural household in West Bengal earns ₹1,547 from crop income per month which is 22% of the total household income. The all-India average for the same would be ₹3,798. The sheer crisis of income does indicate that there must lie a possibility of Left-led peasant movements. While there are a few pockets where one witnesses such protests, a consolidation is not observed. This is perhaps because of two reasons. First, more than half of the class base of the peasant organisation, which are the self-employed persons in agriculture, are now above 45 years of age. Second, perhaps more importantly, crop income is only one of multiple sources of household income. The most important source of income for this semi-proletariat section in the State has become wage income. Of the total household income, 55% is now accrued from wages.

Only a consolidation of the proletarianised small peasants and landless manual workers into a rural-worker movement could revive the traditional class politics that the Left, and more importantly the CPI(M), in the State have been associated with. Without such a consolidation, a shrinking and aged peasantry won’t be able to turn the electoral site in favour of the larger call for reviving a leftist spirit of politics.

While unemployment did rise in West Bengal between 2011 and 2020, it was a common phenomenon across India. What remains of importance in the case of West Bengal is the structurally changing work-site for the workforce. A decline in manufacturing workforce certainly creates challenges for organisations such as the Centre of Indian Trade Unions (CITU) to bring class questions to the forefront. Additionally, since 68% of rural working women are still engaged in activities such as household care and reproductive labour in the State, Trinamool could generate some amount of electoral clientele within the female voters through cash transfer schemes etc.

With a decline in the scale of employment in both agriculture and manufacturing, the sectors that have generated employment are the construction and services sectors. However, the nature of employment is entirely different in both these sectors, and are related to the economic outlook of the policies undertaken by Trinamool. More than 90% of the construction workers in the State are casual wage workers. In 2019-20, 61% of service sector workers were self-employed, which in simple terms mean they are petty service providers fending for themselves due to distress in general. The rest of the 34% salaried service employees, who were earlier largely associated in the political discourse with the so-called ‘Left party society,’ have been carefully sidelined from rural political discourse. This ‘Left-party society’ was often identified with the educated middle class who managed party tasks while being engaged in government services such as school teaching, public sector employment etc.