Making sense of the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire Premium

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu accepts ceasefire with Hezbollah after failing to achieve objectives in Lebanon, facing intense pressure.

When Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu decided to launch a military invasion of Lebanon on October 1 — Israel’s fourth invasion of the neighbouring country — he said his main objective was to let the over 60,000 northern Israelis, who were displaced by Hezbollah rockets, return to their homes. Almost two months later, he accepted a ceasefire with Hezbollah, agreeing to withdraw all Israeli troops to the south of the Lebanese border. The future of the displaced residents remains uncertain. Hezbollah still possesses thousands of drones and rockets and the capability to fire them. Then why did Mr. Netanyahu accept the ceasefire?

Let’s first look at the ceasefire deal, which was mediated by the U.S. and France. According to the agreement, Hezbollah would withdraw its troops and weapons to the north of the Litani River, and Israel would withdraw its troops from southern Lebanon. The Lebanese Army would be deployed in the south, between the Litani and the Israeli border, to monitor and enforce the ceasefire. The withdrawals would take 60 days. Israel says if Hezbollah violates the terms of the agreement or tries to rearm itself, it reserves the right to resume fighting. The displaced residents of both southern Lebanon and northern Israel should be allowed to gradually return to their homes, as per the agreement.

Mr. Netanyahu gave three reasons, explaining the rationale behind the ceasefire. He believes a ceasefire with Hezbollah would allow Israel to focus more on Iran, Israel’s main regional rival; two, Israel can focus on resupplying its own forces who are increasingly facing the fatigue of the two-front war (in Lebanon and Gaza) and three, Israel can isolate Hamas in the ongoing war in Gaza. Israel’s leaders, including its newly appointed Defence Minister Israel Katz, say Hezbollah is not the same organisation it used to be. Two months of intense bombing and ground attacks have destroyed much of its capabilities, they argue. But the reality is much more complicated.

To be sure, Israel has dealt heavy blows to Hezbollah. First, the pager and walkie-talkie explosions across Lebanon hit Hezbollah’s rank and file. Then Israel carried out massive bombings decapitating Hezbollah’s senior leadership. Several top commanders, including the charismatic Hassan Nasrallah, who had led Hezbollah for three decades, were killed. The south Beirut Shia neighbourhood of Dahiye, a Hezbollah stronghold, was subjected to massive bombings. So were the villages in south Lebanon, closer to the Israeli border. Israel also forced Hezbollah to decouple Lebanon from Gaza. The Shia militant group started firing rockets into Israel in October 2023, days after Israel launched its retaliatory war on Gaza following Hamas’s October 7 attack, declaring “solidarity with the Palestinians”. Hassan Nasrallah, the former Hezbollah chief killed by Israel, had said in the past that Hezbollah would declare a ceasefire only if Israel declared a ceasefire in Gaza. But today, Hezbollah declared a ceasefire in return for Israel’s ceasefire and withdrawal from Lebanon. Israel’s war on Gaza continues, and the ceasefire is a climb-down for Hezbollah.

Yet, Israel failed to meet its declared objectives in Lebanon. Mr. Netanyahu had earlier said Israel would continue fighting against Hezbollah until its objectives were met. But on December 24, a few days before the ceasefire was announced, Hezbollah had fired more than 250 rockets into Israel. Israeli troops did not make much territorial gains in southern Lebanon even after two months of fighting. Worse, they failed miserably in destroying or deterring Hezbollah’s rocket capabilities. The high-security locations hit by Hezbollah rockets and drones included a private residence of Prime Minister Netanyahu and a military base in Binyamina. Israel was also taking heavy casualties in Lebanon. In October alone, Israel lost some 35 soldiers in southern Lebanon. So unlike in Gaza, where the remainder of Hamas is operating like a loose insurgency from the ruins of the strip, Israel was facing intense heat in Lebanon. The Biden administration, which fully backed Israel’s war on Gaza, had also heaped up pressure on Israel over Lebanon.  

When the Israel-Hezbollah war of 2006 came to an end, the UN Security Council Resolution 1701 demanded a full withdrawal of the Israeli troops from Lebanon and Hezbollah from the south. It had also demanded the deployment of the Lebanese army in the south and called for the disarmament of Hezbollah. The latest ceasefire agreement is rooted in Resolution 1701. Israel withdrew in 2006, but Hezbollah only grew stronger, by stockpiling more weapons, deepening its presence in the south and building itself as a powerful political and social actor in Lebanon’s fractious polity. Today, Hezbollah has been weakened, but is far from being defeated. Expecting the Lebanese army, which is an inferior fighting force to Hezbollah, to enforce the ceasefire would be myopic, given the past experiences. Mr. Netanyahu might try to sell the ceasefire as a victory for Israel. But facts on the ground offer a different picture.